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This paper provides the latest research developments in the method of choice experiments applied to 
valuation of non-market goods. Choice experiments, along with the, by now, well-known contingent 
valuation method, are very important tools for valuing non-market goods and the results are used in both 
cost-benefit analyses and litigations related to damage assessments. The paper should provide the reader 
with both the means to carry out a choice experiment and to conduct a detailed critical analysis of its 
performance in order to give informed advice about the results. A discussion of the underlying economic 
model of choice experiments is incorporated, as well as a presentation of econometric models consistent 
with economic theory. Furthermore, a detailed discussion on the development of a choice experiment is 
provided, which in particular focuses on the design of the experiment and tests of validity. Finally, a 
discussion on different ways to calculate welfare effects is presented. 
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1. Introduction 
The methods of valuation of non-marketed goods have become crucial when 
determining the costs and benefits of public projects. Non-market valuation exercises 
have been conducted in many different areas, ranging from health and environmental 
applications to transport and public infrastructure projects. In the case of a good that is 
not traded in a market, an economic value of that good obviously cannot be directly 
obtained from the market. Markets fail to exist for some goods either because these 
goods simply do not exist yet, or because they are public goods, for which exclusion is 
not possible. Nevertheless, if one wants to compare different programs by using cost-
benefit analysis, the change in the quality or quantity of the non-market goods should be 
expressed in monetary terms. Another crucial application of valuation techniques is the 
determination of damages associated with a certain event. Under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 in the US, and after 
the events that followed the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, the methods of valuation 
have become a central part of litigation for environmental and health related damages in 
the United States and in several other countries.   
Over the years, the research on valuation of non-market goods has developed into 
two branches: revealed preference methods and stated preference methods. The first 
branch, the revealed preference method, infers the value of a non-market good by 
studying actual (revealed) behaviour on a closely related market. The two most-well-
known revealed preference methods are the hedonic pricing method and the travel cost 
method (see Braden and Kolstad, 1991). In general, the revealed preference approach 
has the advantage of being based on actual choices made by individuals. However, there 
are also a number of drawbacks; most notably that the valuation is conditioned on 
current and previous levels of the non-market good and the impossibility of measuring 
non-use values, i.e. the value of the non-market good not related to usage such as 
existence value, altruistic value and bequest value. Thus, research in the area of 
valuation of non-market goods has therefore seen an increased interest i n another 
branch, the stated preference method, during the last 20 years.  
Stated preference method assesses the value of non-market goods by using 
individuals’ stated behaviour in a hypothetical setting. The method includes a number of 
different approaches such as conjoint analysis, contingent valuation method (CVM) and   3
choice experiments. In most applications, CVM has been the most commonly used 
approach. In particular, closed-ended CVM surveys have been used, in which 
respondents are asked whether or not they would be willing to pay a certain amount of 
money for realizing the level of the non-market good described or, more precisely, the 
change in the level of the good (see Bateman and Willis, 1999 for a review). The idea of 
CVM was first suggested by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947), and the first study ever done was 
in 1961 by Davis (1963). Since then, CVM surveys have become one of the most 
commonly used methods for valuation of non-market goods, although its use has been 
questioned (see e.g. Diamond and Hausman, 1994 and Hanemann, 1994, for a critical 
assessment). At the same time as CVM was developed, other types of stated preference 
techniques, such as choice experiments, evolved in both marketing and transport 
economics (see Louviere 1993 and Polak and Jones 1993 for overviews).  
In a choice experiment, individuals are given a hypothetical setting and asked to 
choose their preferred alternative among several alternatives in a choice set, and they 
are usually asked to perform a sequence of such choices. Each alternative is described 
by a number of attributes or characteristics. A monetary value is included as one of the 
attributes, along with other attributes of importance, when describing the profile of the 
alternative presented (see figure 1). Thus, when individuals make their choice, they 
implicitly make trade-offs between the levels of the attributes in the different 
alternatives presented in a choice set.  
 
>>> Insert Figure 1 
 
The purpose of this paper is to give a detailed description of the steps involved in a 
choice experiment and to discuss the use of this method for valuing non-market goods. 
Choice experiments are becoming ever more frequently applied to the valuation of non-
market goods. This method gives the value of a certain good by separately evaluating 
the preferences of individuals for the relevant attributes that characterize that good, and 
in doing so it also provides a large amount of information that can be used in 
determining the preferred design of the good. In fact, choice experiments originated in 
the fields of transport and marketing, where it was mainly used to study the trade offs 
between the characteristics of transport projects and private goods, respectively. Choice   4
experiments have a long tradition in those fields, and they have only  recently been 
applied to non-market goods in environmental and health economics. We believe that 
applications of this technique will become more frequent in other areas of economics as 
well. Only recently has the aim of damage assessment in litigation shifted from 
monetary compensation to resource compensation. Therefore identification and 
evaluation of the different attributes of a damaged good is required in order to design 
the preferred restoration project (Adamowicz et. al., 1998b; Layton and Brown, 1998). 
Choice experiments are especially well suited for this purpose, and one could expect 
this method to be a central part of future litigation processes involving non-market 
goods.    
The first study to apply choice experiments to non-market valuation was Adamowicz 
et al. (1994). Since then there has been an increasing number of studies, see e.g. 
Adamowicz et al. (1998a), Boxall et al. (1996), Layton and Brown (2000) for 
applications to environment, and e.g. Ryan and Hughes (1997) and Vick and Scott 
(1998) for applications to health. There are several reasons for the increased interest in 
choice experiments in addition to those mentioned above: (i) reduction of some of the 
potential biases of CVM, (ii) more information is elicited from each respondent 
compared to CVM and (iii) the possibility of testing for internal consistency. 
In a choice experiment, as well as in a CVM survey, the economic model is 
intrinsically linked to the statistical model. The economic model is the basis of the 
analysis, and as such, affects the design of the survey and the analysis of the data. In 
this sense, we argue that the realization of a choice experiment is best viewed as an 
integrated and cyclical process that starts with an economic model describing the issue 
to analyse. This model is then continually revised as new information is received from 
the experimental design, the statistical model, focus groups and pilot studies, etc. In this 
paper, we pay special attention to the link between the microeconomic and the statistical 
foundations of a choice experiment, when it comes to designing the choice experiment, 
estimating the econometric model as well as calculating welfare measures. Furthermore, 
we address the issue of internal and external validity of a choice experiment, and 
provide a discussion of the possibility of misrepresentation of preferences by strategic 
responses. The literature on choice experiments has been reviewed by other authors, e.g. 
Adamowicz et al., 1998b; Hanley et al., 1998; Louviere et al., 2000. This paper   5
contributes to providing a thorough description of each of the steps needed when 
performing a choice experiment on a non-market good, with special attention to the 
latest research results in design and estimation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the underlying 
economic theory of choice experiments. In Section 3, econometric models are discussed 
and linked to the section on economic theory. Section 4 concentrates on the design of a 
choice experiment, given the theoretical and empirical models presented in the two 
previous sections. Respondent behaviour and potential biases are discussed in Section 5. 
Section 6 presents different techniques to apply when estimating welfare effects. 
Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper. 
 
2. The Economic Model 
The basis for most microeconomic models of consumer behavior is the maximization of 
a utility function subject to a budget constraint. Choice experiments were inspired by 
the Lancasterian microeconomic approach (Lancaster, 1966), in which individuals 
derive utility from the characteristics of the goods rather than directly from the goods 
themselves. As a result, a change in prices can cause a discrete switch from one bundle 
of goods to another that will provide the most cost-efficient combination of attributes. 
In order to explain the underlying theory of choice experiments, we need to link the 
Lancasterian theory of value with models of consumer demand for discrete choices 
(Hanemann, 1984 and 1999). 
In many situations, an individual's decisions can be partitioned into two parts: (i) 
which good to choose and (ii) how much to consume of the chosen good. Hanemann 
(1984) calls this a discrete/continuous choice. An example of this choice structure is the 
case of a tourist deciding to visit a national park. The decision can be partitioned into 
which park to visit, and how long to stay. In order to obtain a value of a certain park, 
both stages of the decision-making process are crucial to the analysis and should be 
modelled in a consistent manner.   
In general, choice experiments applied to non-marketed goods assume a specific 
continuous dimension as part of the framework, in which a discrete choice takes place. 
By referring to the example above, one could ask for a discrete choice (which type of 
park do you prefer to visit?) given a one week (day, month) trip. In this case, the   6
decision context is constructed so that it isolates the discrete choice, therefore allowing 
the individual to make a purely discrete choice (Hanemann, 1999). A CVM survey 
assumes the same specific continuous dimension since the objective is to obtain the 
value of a certain predefined program that includes a given continuous decision. Finally, 
note that many non-marketed goods are actually public in nature, especially in the sense 
that the same quantity of the good is available for all agents. In such cases, each 
individual can only choose one of the offered alternatives, given its cost. 
 The economic model presented in this section deals only with such purely discrete 
choices. For more information on the discrete and continuous choice see Hanemann 
(1984). Formally, each individual solves the following maximization problem: 
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where,  [ ] .. U  is a quasiconcave utility function;  ) ( i i A c  is alternative combination  i 
(profile  i) as a function of its generic and alternative specific attributes, the vector  i A ; 
i p  is the price of each profile; z is a composite bundle of ordinary goods with its price 
normalized to 1 and y is income. A number of properties follow from the specification 
of the maximization problem: 
1. The  s ci'  are profiles defined for all the relevant alternatives. For example, one such 
profile could be a visit to a national park in a rainforest, with 50 kms of marked walking 
tracks through the park and a visitor centre. Additionally, the choice of any profile is for 
a fixed, and given, amount of it, e.g. a day or a unit. There are N such profiles, where N 
is in principle given by all relevant profiles. However, in practice, N will be determined 
depending on the type of design used to construct the profiles, the number of attributes, 
and the attribute levels included in the choice experiment. Consequently, with the 
selection of attributes and attribute levels for a choice experiment we are already 
limiting or defining the utility function.    7
2. The price variable in the budget restriction must be related to the complete profile of 
the alternative, including the given continuous dimension, for example price per day or 
per visit.  
3. Restriction ii defines the number of alternatives that can be chosen. In general, in a 
choice experiment we are interested in obtaining a single choice. For example, in the 
case of perfect substitutes, there will be a corner solution with only one profile chosen.
1 
Alternatively, the choice experiment can specify the need for a single choice. If the 
alternatives refer to different public goods or environmental amenities, one can specify 
that only one will be available. Even if the alternatives refer to private goods such as a 
specific treatment program, the researcher can specify that only one of them can be 
chosen. 
4. In a purely discrete choice, the selection of a particular profile  ) ( j j A c , which is 
provided in an exogenously fixed quantity, implies that, for a given income, the amount 
of ordinary goods z  that can be purchased is also fixed. Combining this with the 
restriction that only a single profile,  j c , can be chosen results in: 
 
j jc p y z - =   (2) 
 
5. Restriction iii specifies that the individual will choose a non-negative quantity of the 
composite good and the goods being studied. If we believe that the good is essential to 
the individual or that an environmental program has to be implemented, then we have to 
force the respondent to make a choice ( 0 > i c  for at least one i).  
To solve the maximization problem we follow a two-step process. First we assume a 
discrete choice, profile j is chosen, i.e.  0   , = = i
fixed
j j c c c   j i „ " , where 
fixed
j c  is the 
fixed continuous measure of the given profile. We further assume weak 
complementarity, i.e. the attributes of the other non-selected profiles do not affect the 
utility function of profile j (Mäler, 1974; Hanemann, 1984). Formally we write: 
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1 In the case of perfect substitutes, it is the form of the utility function rather than restriction ii that ensures 
a single choice.   8
Using (2) and (3) we can write the conditional utility function, given 
fixed
j j c c =  as: 
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In the next step we go back to the unconditional indirect utility function: 
 
[ ] [ ] ) c p y , A ( V ),..., c p y , A ( V max y , p , A V N N N N 1 1 1 1 - - = ,  (5) 
 
where the function  [ ] .. V  captures the discrete choice, given an exogenous and fixed 
quantitative assumption regarding the continuous choice. Thus, it follows that the 
individual chooses the profile  j  if and only if: 
 
) c p y , A ( V ) c p y , A ( V i i i i j j j j - > - ,  j i „ "    (6) 
 
Equations (5) and (6) complete the economic model for purely discrete choices. These 
two equations are the basis for the econometric model and the estimation of welfare 
effects that are discussed in the following sections. 
Note that the economic model underlying a CVM study can be seen as a special case 
of the model above, where there are only two profiles. One profile is the “before the 
project” description of the good, and the other is the “after the project” description of 
the same good. Thus  a certain respondent will say yes to a bid if 
[ ] [ ] y A c V bid y A c V i i i i i i ), ( ), (
0 0 1 1 > - , where 
t
i A  entirely describes the good, including its 
continuous dimension.  
Until now we have presented and discussed a deterministic model of consumer 
behaviour. The next step is to make such a model operational. There are two main 
issues involved: one is the assumption regarding the functional form of the utility 
function and the other is to introduce a component into the utility function to capture 
unobservable behaviour. In principle, these issues are linked, since the form of the 
utility function determines the relation between the probability distribution of the 
disturbances and the probability distribution of the indirect utility function.  
 
3. The Econometric Model 
Stated behaviour surveys sometimes reveal preference structures that may seem 
inconsistent with the deterministic model. It is assumed that these inconsistencies stem   9
from observational deficiencies arising from unobservable components such as 
characteristics of the individual or non-included attributes of the alternatives in the 
experiment, measurement error and/or heterogeneity of preferences (Hanemann and 
Kanninen, 1999). In order to allow for these effects, the Random Utility approach 
(McFadden, 1974) is used to link the deterministic model with a statistical model of 
human behaviour. A random disturbance with a specified probability distribution, e, is 
introduced into the model, and an individual will choose profile j if and only if: 
 
) , , ( ) , , ( i i i i i j j j j j c p y A V c p y A V e - > e - ;  j i „ "   (7) 
 
In terms of probabilities, we write: 
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The exact specification of the econometric model depends on how the random elements, 
e, enter the conditional indirect utility function and the distributional assumption. Let us 
divide the task into two parts: (i) specification of the utility function, and (ii) 
specification of the probability distribution of the error term.  
 
3.1 Specification of the Utility Function 
The most common assumption is that the error term enters the utility function as an 
additive term. This assumption, although restrictive, greatly simplifies the computation 
of the results and the estimation of welfare measures. In section 3.2 we present a 
random parameter model, which i s an example of a model with the stochastic 
component entering the utility function via the slope coefficients, i.e. non-additively 
(Hanemann, 1999). 
Under an additive formulation the probability of choosing alternative j can be written 
as:  
 
{ } { } j i ; ) c p y , A ( V ) c p y , A ( V P j   choose P i i i i i j j j j j „ " e + - > e + - =   (9) 
 
In order to specify a utility function, we need to specify the functional form for  (...) V  
and to select the relevant attributes (Ai) that determine the utility derived from each 
alternative. These attributes should then be included in the choice experiment.    10
When choosing the functional form, there is a trade-off between the benefits of 
assuming a less restrictive formulation and the complications that arise from doing so. 
This is especially relevant for the way income enters the utility function. A simpler 
functional form (e.g. linear in income) makes estimation of the parameters and 
calculation of welfare effects easier, but the estimates are based on restrictive 
assumptions (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Most often researchers have been inclined 
to use a simpler linear in the parameters utility function. Since the need for simple 
functional forms is linked to the estimation of welfare measures, we will postpone the 
discussion to section 6, where we investigate in more detail the implications of the 
chosen functional form on the calculation of exact welfare estimates. 
Regarding the selection of attributes it is important to be aware that the collected data 
come from a specific design based on a priori assumptions regarding estimable 
interaction effects between attributes. Once the experiment has been conducted we are 
restricted to testing for only those effects that were considered in the design. This shows 
the importance of focus groups and pilot studies when constructing the experiment. 
 
3.2 Specification of the Probability Distribution of the Error Term 
The most common model used in applied work has been the Multinomial Logit (MNL) 
model. This model relies on restrictive assumptions, and its popularity rests on its 
simplicity of estimation. We begin by introducing the MNL model and discussing its 
limitations, and then we introduce less restrictive models. Suppose that the choice 
experiment consists of M choice sets, where each choice set,  m S , consists of  m K  
alternatives, such that  { } Km m m A A S ,...., 1 = , where  i A  is a vector of attributes. We can 
then write the choice probability for alternative j from a choice set  m S  as 
 
{ } { }= ˛ " e + - > e + - = m i i i im i j j j jm j m S i c p y A V c p y A V P S j P ; ) , ( ) , ( |  
= } ; (...) (...) { m i i j j S i V V P ˛ " e > - e + . 
(10) 
 
We can then express this choice probability in terms of the joint cumulative density 
function of the error term as: 
 
) , , , ( ) | ( 2 1 | n j j j j j j S m V V V V V V CDF S j P
m - e + - e + - e + = e K .  (10’) 
   11
The MNL model assumes that the random components are independently and 
identically distributed with an extreme value type I distribution (Gumbel). This 
distribution is characterized by a scale parameter  m and location parameter  d.
2 The 
scale parameter is related to the variance of the distribution such that 
2 2 6 var m p = e . If 
we assume that the random components are extreme value distributed, the choice 
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In principle, the size of the scale parameter is irrelevant when it comes to the choice 
probability of a certain alternative (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985), but by looking at 
equation (11) it is clear that the true parameters are confounded with the scale 
parameter. Moreover, it is not possible to identify this parameter from the data. For 
example, if the scale is doubled, the estimated parameters in the linear specification will 
adjust to double their previous values.
3 The presence of a scale parameter raises several 
issues for the analysis of the estimations. First consider the variance of the error term: 
2 2 6 var m p = e . An increase in the scale reduces the variance; therefore high fit models 
have larger scales. The two extreme cases are  0 ﬁ m  where, in a binary model, the 
choice probabilities become ½, and  ¥ ﬁ m  where the model becomes completely 
deterministic (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Second, the impact of the scale parameter 
on the estimated coefficients imposes restrictions on their interpretation. All parameters 
within an estimated model have the same scale and therefore it is valid to compare their 
signs and relative sizes. On the other hand, it is not possible to directly compare 
parameters from different models as the scale parameter and the true parameters are 
confounded. Nevertheless, it is possible to compare estimated parameters from two 
different data sets, or to combine data sets (for example stated and revealed preference 
data). Swait and Louviere (1993) show how to estimate the ratio of scale parameters for 
                                                 
2 In practice, the distribution chosen is the standard Gumbel distribution with  1 = m  and  0 = d .  
3 In a linear specification, 
true estimated mb = b , and 
estimated b  will adjust to changes in  m. The issue of the 
scale parameter is not specific to multinomial models and Gumbel distributions. For the case of probit   12
two different data sets. This procedure can then be used to compare different models or 
to pool data from different sources (see e.g. Adamowicz et al., 1994; Ben-Akiva and 
Morikawa, 1990).  
There are two problems with the MNL specification: (i) t he alternatives are 
independent and (ii) there is a limitation in modelling variation in taste among 
respondents. The first problem arises because of the IID assumption (constant variance), 
which results in the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. This property 
states that the ratio of choice probabilities between two alternatives in a choice set is 
unaffected by changes in that choice set. If this assumption is violated the MNL should 
not be used. One type of model that relaxes the homoskedasticity assumption of the 
MNL model is the nested MNL model. In this model the alternatives are placed in 
subgroups, and the variance is allowed to differ between the subgroups but it is assumed 
to be the same within each group. An alternative specification is to assume that error 
terms are independently, but non-identically, distributed type I extreme value, with scale 
parameter  i m  (Bhat, 1995). This would allow for different cross elasticities among all 
pairs of alternatives, i.e. relaxing the IIA restriction. Furthermore, we could also model 
heterogeneity in the covariance among nested alternatives (Bhat, 1997).  
The second problem arises when there is taste variation among respondents due to 
observed and/or unobserved heterogeneity. Observed heterogeneity can be incorporated 
into the systematic part of the model by allowing for interaction between socio-
economic characteristics and attributes of the alternatives or constant terms. However, 
the MNL model can also be generalized to a so-called mixed MNL model in order to 
further account for unobserved heterogeneity. In order to illustrate this type of model, 
let us write the utility function of alternative j for individual q as: 
 
jq jq q jq jq jq jq x x x U e + b + b = e + b =
~
.  (12) 
 
Thus, each individual’s coefficient vector  b is the sum of the population mean  b and 
individual deviation  q b
~
. The stochastic part of utility,  jq jq qx e + b
~
, is correlated among 
alternatives, which means that the model does not exhibit the IIA property. If the error 
                                                                                                                                               
models, the scale parameter of the normal distribution is  s 1 . Everything we say here about the scale 
parameter of the Gumbel distribution applies to nested MNL and probit models as well.   13
terms are IID standard normal we have a random parameter multinomial probit model. 
If instead the error terms are IID type I extreme value, we have a random parameter 
logit model. 
Let tastes, b, vary in the population with a distribution with density  ) | ( q b f , where 
q is a vector of the true parameters of the taste distribution. The unconditional 
probability of alternative j for individual q can then be expressed as the integral of the 
conditional probability in (11) over all values of  b: 
 




















In general the integrals in equation (13) cannot be evaluated analytically, and we have 
to rely on simulation methods for the probabilities (see e.g. Brownstone and Train, 
1999).  
When estimating these types of models we have to assume a distribution for each of 
the random coefficients. It may seem natural to assume a normal distribution. However, 
for many of the attributes it may be reasonable to expect that all respondents have the 
same sign for their coefficients. In this case it may be more sensible to assume a log-
normal distribution. For example, if we assume that the price coefficient is log-normally 
distributed, we ensure that all individuals have a non-positive price coefficient. 
In most choice experiments, respondents make repeated choices, and we assume that 
the preferences are stable over the experiment. Consequently, the utility coefficients are 
allowed to vary among individuals but they are constant among the choice situations for 
each individual (Revelt and Train, 1998; Train, 1998). It is also possible to let the 
coefficients for the individual vary over time; in this case among the choice situations in 
the survey. This type of specification would be valid if we suspect fatigue or learning 
effects in the survey. 
McFadden and Train (2000) show that under some mild regularity conditions any 
discrete choice model derived from random utility maximization has choice 
probabilities that can be approximated by a mixed MNL model. This is an interesting 
result because mixed MNL models can then be used to approximate difficult parametric   14
random utility models, such as the multinomial probit model, by taking the distributions 
underlying these models as the parameter distributions. 
 
4. Design of a Choice Experiment 
There are four steps involved in the design of a choice experiment: (i) definition of 
attributes, attribute levels and customisation, (ii) experimental design, (iii) experimental 
context and questionnaire development and (iv) choice of sample and sampling strategy. 
These four steps should be seen as an integrated process with feedback.  The 
development of the final design involves repeatedly conducting the steps described here, 
and incorporating new information as it comes along. In this section, we focus on the 
experimental design and the context of the experiment, and only briefly discuss the 
other issues. 
 
4.1 Definition of Attributes and Levels  
The first step in the development of a choice experiment is to conduct a series of focus 
group studies aimed at selecting the relevant attributes. A starting point involves 
studying the attributes and attribute levels used in previous studies and their importance 
in the choice decisions. Additionally, the selection of attributes should be guided by the 
attributes that are expected to affect respondents' choices, as well as those attributes that 
are policy relevant. This information forms the base for which attributes and relevant 
attribute levels to include in the first round of focus group studies.  
The task in a focus group is to determine the number of attributes and attribute 
levels, and the actual values of the attributes. As a first step, the focus group studies 
should provide information about credible minimum and maximum attribute levels. 
Additionally, it is important to identify any possible interaction effect between the 
attributes. If we want to calculate welfare measures, it is necessary to include a 
monetary attribute such as a price or a cost. In such a case, the focus group studies will 
indicate the best way to present a monetary attribute. Credibility plays a crucial role and 
the researcher must ensure that the attributes selected and their levels can be combined 
in a credible manner. Hence, proper restrictions may have to be imposed (see e.g. 
Layton and Brown, 1998).   15
Customisation is an issue in the selection of attributes and their levels. It is an 
attempt to make the choice alternatives more realistic by relating them to actual levels. 
If possible an alternative with the attribute levels describing today’s situation should be 
included which would then relate the other alternatives to the current situation. An 
alternative is to directly relate some of the attributes to the actual level. For example, the 
levels for visibility could be set 15% higher and 15% lower than today’s level (Bradley, 
1988).  
The focus group sessions should shed some light on the best way to introduce and 
explain the task of making a succession of choices from a series of choice sets. As 
Layton and Brown (1998) explain, choosing repeatedly is not necessarily a behavior 
that could be regarded as obvious for all goods. When it comes to recreation,  for 
example, it is clear that choosing a site in a choice set does not preclude choosing 
another site given different circumstances. However, in the case of public goods, such 
repeated choices might require further justification in the experiment. 
A general problem with applying a choice experiment to an environmental good or to 
an improvement in health status is that respondents are not necessarily familiar with the 
attributes presented. Furthermore, the complexity of a choice experiment in terms of the 
number of choice sets and/or the number of attributes in each choice set may affect the 
quality of the responses; this will be discussed in Section 4.3. Basically, there is a trade-
off between the complexity of the choice experiment and the quality of the responses. 
The complexity of a choice experiment can be investigated by using verbal protocols, 
i.e. by asking the individual to read the survey out loud and/or to think aloud when 
responding; this approach has been used in CVM surveys (e.g. Schkade and Payne, 
1993). Thereby identifying sections that attract the readers' attention and testing the 
understanding of the experiment 
 
4.2 Experimental Design 
Experimental design is concerned with how to create the choice sets in an efficient way, 
i.e. how to combine attribute levels into profiles of alternatives and profiles into choice 
sets. The standard approach in marketing, transport and health economics has been to 
use so-called orthogonal designs, where the variations of the attributes of the 
alternatives are uncorrelated in all choice sets. Recently, there has been a development   16
of optimal experimental designs for choice experiments based on multinomial logit 
models. These optimal design techniques are important tools in the development of a 
choice experiment, but there are other more practical aspects to consider. We briefly 
introduce optimal design techniques for choice experiments and conclude by discussing 
some of the limitations of statistical optimality in empirical applications.  
A design is developed in  two steps: (i) obtaining the optimal combinations of 
attributes and attribute levels to be included in the experiment and (ii) combining those 
profiles into choice sets. A starting point is a full factorial design, which is a design that 
contains all possible combinations of the attribute levels that characterize the different 
alternatives. A full factorial design is, in general, very large and not tractable in a choice 
experiment. Therefore we need to choose a subset of all possible combinations, while 
following some criteria for optimality and then construct the choice sets. In choice 
experiments, design techniques used for linear models have been popular. Orthogonality 
in particular has often been used as the principle part of an efficient design. More 
recently researchers in marketing have developed design techniques based on the D -
optimal criteria for non-linear models in a choice experiment context. D -optimality is 




- W = -
K
efficiency D .  (14) 
 
Huber and Zwerina (1996) identify four principles for an efficient design of a choice 
experiment based on a non-linear model: (i) orthogonality, (ii) level balance, (iii) 
minimal overlap and (iv) utility balance. Level balance requires that the levels of each 
attribute occur with equal frequency in the design. A design has minimal overlap when 
an attribute level does not repeat itself in a choice set. Finally, utility balance requires 
that the utility of each alternative within a choice set is equal.  The last property is 
important since the larger the difference in utility between the alternatives the less 
information is extracted from that specific choice set. At the same time, this principle is 
difficult to satisfy since it requires prior knowledge about the true distribution of the 
parameters. The theory of optimal design for choice experiments is related to optimal 
design of the bid vector in a CVM survey. The optimal design in a CVM survey 
depends on the assumption regarding the distribution of WTP (see e.g. Duffield and 
Patterson, 1991; Kanninen, 1993).   17
Several design strategies explore some or all of the requirements for an efficient 
design of a choice experiment. Kuhfeld et al. (1994) use a computerized search 
algorithm to minimize the D-error in order to construct an efficient, but not necessarily 
orthogonal, linear design. However, these designs do not rely on any prior information 
about the utility parameters and hence do not satisfy utility balance. Zwerina et al. 
(1996) adapt the search algorithm of Kuhfeld et al. (1994) to the four principles for 
efficient choice designs as described in Huber and Zwerina (1996).
4 In order to illustrate 
their design approach it is necessary to return to the MNL model. McFadden (1974) 
showed that the maximum likelihood estimator for the conditional logit model is 
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed with the mean equal to  b and a 
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This covariance matrix, which is the main component in the D-optimal criteria, depends 
on the true parameters in the utility function, since the choice probabilities,  in P , depend 
on these parameters.
5 Consequently, an optimal design of a choice experiment depends, 
as in the case of the optimal design of bid values in a CV survey, on the value of the 
true parameters of the utility function. Adapting the approach of Zwerina et al. (1996) 
consequently requires prior information about the parameters. Carlsson and Martinsson 
(2000) discuss strategies for obtaining this information, which includes results from 
other studies, expert judgments, pilot studies and sequential designs strategies. 
Kanninen (1993) discusses a sequential design approach for closed-ended CVM surveys 
and she finds that this approach improves the efficiency of the design. A similar strategy 
can be used in designing choice experiments. The response data from the pilot studies 
and the actual choice experiment can be used to estimate the value of the parameters. 
The design can then be update during the experiment depending on the results of the 
estimated parameters. The results from these estimations may not only require a new 
                                                 
4 The SAS code is available at ftp://ftp.sas.com/techsup/download/technote/ts643/.   18
design, but changes in the attribute levels as well. There are  other simpler design 
strategies which do not directly require information about the parameters. However, in 
all cases, some information about the shape of the utility function is needed in order to 
make sure that the individuals will make trade-offs between attributes. The only choice 
experiment in environmental valuation that has adopted a D-optimal design strategy is 
Carlsson and Martinsson (2001). In a health economic application by Johnson et al. 
(2000) a design partly based on D-optimal criteria is applied. 
Kanninen (2001) presents a more general approach to optimal design than Zwerina et 
al. (1996). In her design, the selection of the number of attribute levels is also a part of 
the optimal design problem. Kanninen (2001) shows that in a D-optimal design each 
attribute should only have two levels, even in the case of a multinomial choice 
experiment, and that the levels should be set at the two extreme points of the 
distribution of each attribute.
6 Furthermore, Kanninen (2001) shows that for a given 
number of attributes and alternatives, the D-optimal design results in certain response 
probabilities. This means that updating the optimal design is simpler than updating the 
design presented in Zwerina et al. (1996). In order to achieve the desired response 
probabilities the observed response probabilities from previous applications have to be 
calculated, and a balancing attribute is then included. This type of updating was adopted 
by Steffens et al. (2000) in a choice experiment on bird watching. they found that the 
updating improved the efficiency of the estimates. 
There are several problems with these more advanced design strategies due to their 
complexity, and it is not clear whether the advantages of being more statistically 
efficient outweigh the problems. The first problem is obtaining information about the 
parameter values. Although some information about the coefficients is required for 
other design strategies as well, more elaborate designs based on utility balance are more 
sensitive to the quality of information used, and incorrect information on the parameters 
may bias the final estimates. Empirically, utility balance makes the choice harder for the 
respondents, since they have to choose from alternatives that are very close in terms of 
utility. This might result in a random choice. The second problem is that the designs 
presented here are based on a conditional logit model where, for example, homogeneous 
                                                                                                                                               
5  This is an important difference from the design of linear models where the covariance matrix is 
proportional to the information matrix, i.e. 
2 1 ) ' ( s = W
- X X .   19
preferences are assumed. Violation of this assumption may bias the estimates. The third 
problem i s the credibility of different combinations of attributes. If the correlation 
between attributes is ignored, the choice sets may not be credible to the respondent 
(Johnson et al., 2000, and Layton and Brown, 1998). In this case it may be optimal to 
remove such combinations although it would be statistically efficient to include them.  
 
4.3 Experimental Context, Test of Validity and Questionnaire Development 
In the previous section, we addressed optimal design of a choice experiment from a 
statistical perspective. However, in empirical applications there may be other issues to 
consider in order to extract the maximum amount of information from the respondents.  
Task complexity is determined by factors such as the number of choice sets 
presented to the individual, the number of alternatives in each choice set, the number of 
attributes describing those alternatives and the correlation between attributes for each 
alternative (Swait and Adamowicz, 1996). Most authors find that task complexity 
affects the decisions (Adamowicz et. al., 1998a; Bradley, 1988). Mazotta and Opaluch 
(1995) and Swait and Adamowicz (1996) analyze task complexity by assuming it 
affects the variance term of the model. The results of both papers indicate that task 
complexity does in fact affect the variance, i.e. an increased complexity increases the 
noise associated with the choices. Task complexity can also arise when the amount of 
effort demanded when choosing the preferred alternative in a choice set may be so high 
that it exceeds the ability of the respondents to select their preferred option. The number 
of attributes in a choice experiment is studied by Mazotta and Opaluch (1995) and they 
find that including more than 4 to 5 attributes in a choice set may lead to a severe 
detriment to the quality of the data collected due to the task complexity.  
In complex cases, respondents may simply answer carelessly or use some simplified 
lexicographic decision rule. This could also arise if the levels of the attributes are not 
sufficiently differentiated to ensure trade-offs. Another possibility is 'yea' saying or 'nay' 
saying, where the respondent, for example, always opt for the most environmentally 
friendly alternative. Finally, lexicographic orderings may be an indication of strategic 
behaviour of the respondent. In practice, it is difficult to separate these cases from 
preferences that are genuinely lexicographic, in which case the respondents have a 
                                                                                                                                               
6 The design is derived under the assumption that all attributes are quantitative variables.   20
ranking of the attributes, but the choice of an alternative is based solely on the level of 
their m ost important attribute. Genuine lexicographic preferences in a choice 
experiment are not a problem, although they provide us with little information in the 
analysis compared to the other respondents. However, if a respondent chooses to use a 
lexicographic strategy because of its simplicity, systematic errors are introduced, which 
may bias the results. One strategy for distinguishing between different types of 
lexicographic behaviour is to use debriefing questions, where respondents are asked to 
give reasons why they, for example, focused on only one or two of the attributes in the 
choice experiment. However, in a thoroughly pre-tested choice experiment using focus 
groups and pre tests, these problems should have been detected and corrected. 
An issue related to task complexity in is the stability of preferences. In choice 
experiments the utility function of each individual is assumed to be stable throughout 
the experiment. The complexity of the exercise might cause violations of this 
assumption, arising from  learning and fatigue effects. Johnson et al. (2000) test for 
stability by comparing responses to the same choice sets included both at the beginning 
and at the end of the experiment. They find a strong indication of instability of 
preferences. However, there is a potential problem of confounding effects of the 
sequencing of the choice sets and the stability of the preferences. An alternative 
approach, without the confounding effect, is applied in Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) 
in a choice experiment on donations to environmental projects. In their exercise, half of 
the respondents receive the choice sets in the order {A,B} and the other half in the order 
{B,A}. A test for stability is then performed by comparing the preferences obtained for 
the choices in subset A, when it was given in the sequence {A,B}, with the preferences 
obtained when the choices in subset A were given in the sequence {B,A}. This can then 
be formally tested in a likelihood ratio test between the pooled model of the choices in 
subset A and the separate groups. A similar test can be performed for subset B. By 
using this method Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) find only a minor problem with 
instability of preferences. Layton and Brown (2000) conduct a similar test of stability in 
a choice experiment on policies for mitigating impacts of global climate change; they 
did not reject the hypothesis of stable preferences. Bryan et al. (2000) compare 
responses in the same way, but with the objective of testing for reliability, and find that 
57 percent of the respondents did not change their responses when given the same   21
choice set in a two-part choice experiment. Furthermore, in an identical follow-up 
experiment two weeks after the original experiment, 54 percent of the respondents made 
the same choices on at least eleven out of twelve choice situations. 
Another issue to consider in the development of the questionnaire is whether or not 
to include a base case scenario or an opt-out alternative. This is particularly important if 
the purpose of the experiment is to calculate welfare measures. If we do not allow 
individuals to opt for a status quo alternative, this may distort the welfare measure for 
non-marginal changes. This decision should, however, be guided by whether or not the 
current situation and/or non-participation is a relevant alternative. A non-participation 
decision can be econometrically analysed by e.g. a nested logit model with participants 
and non-participants in different branches (see e.g. Blamey et al., 2000). A simpler 
alternative is t o model non-participation as an alternative where the levels of the 
attributes are set to the current attribute levels. Another issue is whether to present the 
alternatives in the choice sets in a generic (alternatives A, B, C) or alternative specific 
form (national park, protected area, beach). Blamey et al. (2000) discuss advantages of 
these two approaches and compare them in an empirical study. An advantage of using 
alternative specific labels is familiarity with the context and hence the cognitive burden 
is reduced. However, the risk is that the respondent may not consider trade-offs between 
attributes. This approach is preferred when the emphasis is on valuation of the labelled 
alternatives. An advantage of the generic model is that the respondent is less inclined to 
only consider the label and thereby focus more on the attributes. Therefore, this 
approach is preferred when the emphasis is on the marginal rates of substitution 
between attributes.  
In the random utility model, unobservable effects are modelled by an error term and, 
in general, we assume that respondents have rational, stable, transitive and monotonic 
preferences. Also, we assume they do not have any problems in completing a choice 
experiment, and that there are no systematic errors, such as respondents getting tired or 
changing their preferences as they acquire experience with the experiment, i.e. learning 
effects. Internal tests of validity are designed to check these standard assumptions. 
These tests can be directly incorporated into the design of an experiment. There have 
been several validity tests of choice experiments in the marketing and transport 
literature, for example Ben-Akiva et al. (1992) and Leigh et al. (1984). The evidence   22
from a large proportion of studies is that choice experiments generally pass these tests 
of validity. However, it is not obvious that these results carry over into choice 
experiments done in an environmental or health economic context. The reason is that 
these non-market goods in many respects differ from, f or example, transportation, 
which is a good that most respondents are familiar with. It is therefore of importance to 
test the validity of choice experiments in the context of valuation of general non- 
marketed goods. Since there are few applications of choice experiments in valuation, 
few tests of internal validity have been performed.  
In order to test for transitive preferences, we have to construct such a test. For 
example, in the case of a pair-wise choice experiment we have to include three specific 
choice sets: (1) Alt. 1 versus Alt. 2, (2) Alt. 2 vs. Alt. 3, and (3) Alt. 1 vs. Alt. 3. For 
example if the respondent chooses Alt. 1 in the first choice set and Alt. 2 in the second 
choice set, then Alt. 1 must be chosen in the third choice if the respondent has transitive 
preferences. Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) conduct tests of transitivity and they do 
not find any strong indications of violations. Internal tests of monotonicity can also be 
implemented in a choice experiment and in a sense tests of monotonicity are already 
built-in in a choice experiment as the level of an attribute changes in an experiment. 
Comparing the expected sign to the actual sign and significance of the coefficient can be 
seen as a weak test monotonicity. Johnson et al. (2000) d iscuss a simple test of 
dominated pair, which simply tests if a respondent chooses a dominated alternative.  
 
4.4 Sample and Sampling Strategy 
The choice of survey population obviously depends on the objective of the survey. 
Given the survey population, a  sampling strategy has to be determined. Possible 
strategies include a simple random sample, a stratified random sample or a choice-based 
sample. A simple random sample is generally a reasonable choice. One reason for 
choosing a more specific sampling method may be the existence of a relatively small 
but important sub-group which is of particular interest to the study. Another reason may 
be to increase the precision of the estimates for a particular sub-group. In practice the 
selection of sample strategy and sample size is also largely dependent on the budget 
available for the survey.   23
Louviere et al. (2000) provide a formula to calculate the minimum sample size. The 
size of the sample, n, is determined by the desired level of accuracy of the estimated 
probabilities,  p ˆ . Let  p be a true proportion of the relevant population,  a is the 
percentage of deviation between  p ˆ and p that can be accepted and  a is the confidence 
level of the estimations such that:  a ‡ £ - ) | ˆ Pr(| ap p p  for a given n. Given this, the 


















Note that n refers to the size of the sample and not the number of observations. Since 
each individual makes r succession of choices in a choice experiment, the number of 
observations will be much larger (a sample of 500 individuals answering 8 choice sets 
each will result in 4000 observations). One of the advantages of choice experiments is 
that the amount of information extracted from a given sample size is much larger than, 
for example, using referendum based methods and, hence, the efficiency of the 
estimates is improved. The formula above is only valid for a simple random sample and 
with independency between the choices. For a more detailed look at this issue see e.g. 
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985). In a health economic context, the availability of 
potential respondents can in certain cases be limited and hence the equation above can 
be used to solve for a, i.e. the percentage deviation between  p ˆ and p that we must 
accept given the sample size used.  
 
5. Elicitation of preferences in choice experiments 
There has been an extensive discussion about the possibility of eliciting preferences for 
non-market goods in hypothetical surveys. While the discussion has focused on CVM 
(see e.g. Diamond and Hausman, 1994 and Hanemann, 1994) most of the results are 
valid for choice experiments as well. We believe that there are particular problems with 
measuring so-called non-use values in hypothetical surveys. We do not take the position 
that non-use values should not be measured, but rather that there are some inherent 
problems with measuring these values. The reason for this is that non-use values are 
largely motivated by "purchase of moral satisfaction" (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992) 
and "warm glow" (Andreoni, 1989), and that they often involve an "important perceived   24
ethical dimension" (Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter, 2001). We are not questioning 
these values per se; on the contrary, they may even be important shares of total value. 
The problem is that the cost of acquiring a "warm glow" or a satisfaction of acting 
ethical is much lower in a hypothetical survey situation than in an actual situation. This 
leaves us in a difficult position, since stated preference methods are essentially the only 
methods available for measuring non-use values. However, there are reasons to believe 
that choice experiments may be less prone to trigger this type of behaviour than CVM 
surveys. The reason for this is that in a choice experiment individuals have to make 
trade-offs between several attributes, several of which may contain non-use values.  
Another issue involves incentives for truthfully revealing preferences in hypothetical 
surveys. Carson et al. (1999) argue that given a consequential survey a binary discrete 
choice is incentive compatible for the cases of (i) a new public goods with coercive 
payments, (ii) the choice between two public goods and (iii) a change in an existing 
private or quasi-public good. A consequential survey is defined as one that is perceived 
by the respondent as something that may potentially influence agency decisions, as well 
as one where the respondent cares about the outcome. The problem arises when the 
individual faces not one but a sequence of binary choices. Let us assume we are dealing 
with a public good, i.e. everybody will enjoy the same quantity and composition of the 
good after the government has decided its provisions. The respondents could then 
perceive the sequence of binary choices as a voting agenda, and, if they expect one of 
their less preferred outcomes to be chosen, they would have an incentive to misrepresent 
their true preferences. The same type of problem arises with multinomial choices. If 
only one alternative is to be chosen, the multinomial choice is reduced to a binary 
choice between the two alternatives that the respondent believes are most likely to be 
chosen, even if these two alternatives are not the most preferred ones. The problem with 
these incentives is that the preference profile constructed from the survey is not a 
reflection of the true preferences, but rather a reflection of strategic behaviour. The 
choice experiment would then be flawed and any welfare estimate would not be reliable. 
This issue clearly demands attention from researchers, although we believe that the 
importance of these results should not be overemphasized.  
It is in general more difficult to behave strategically in a choice experiment, when 
compared to a CVM survey. In a CVM survey the respondent "only" has to consider a   25
single change in a project involving a certain payment. A typical choice experiment 
consists of two to four alternatives, where each alternative is described by at least three 
or four attributes. The selection of all attributes is done under the premise that they are 
relevant determinants of choice behaviours of individuals and the levels are set such that 
they imply meaningful changes in utility. Furthermore, there is, generally, no clearly 
identifiable agenda in a sequence of choices, where almost all levels of attributes change 
from one choice set to another. Thus, it is more difficult for a respondent to behave 
strategically in a choice experiment. First they need to create an expectation regarding 
the values of each of the alternatives in the choice set. Based on this expectation they 
need to calculate the decision weights for each pair-wise decision. Of particular 
importance is the fact that most choice experiments, as well as CVM surveys, deal with 
situations that are not familiar to the respondent. The fact that there are no markets for 
some of the evaluated goods means that there is limited, if any, information about the 
preferences of other individuals. There are seldom any opinion polls, prices or other 
types of information that the respondent can use. Thus in general the respondent is in an 
unfamiliar situation and with limited prior information on the preferences of others.  
The assumption that each respondent has perfect information regarding the 
preferences of other respondents is unrealistic and the question is how uncertainty 
affects the incentives for truthful revelation. Here we illustrate this with the model of 
Gutowski and Georges (1993). Each respondent has a subjective value of each of three 
alternatives,  1 a ,  2 a  and  3 a . A respondent with the preference ordering  3 2 1 a a a f f , 
where the subjective value of the most preferred alternative,  ) ( 1 a v , is equal to one, and 
the subjective value of the least preferred alternative,  ) ( 3 a v , is equal to zero. The 
subjective value of  2 a ,  ) ( 2 a v , is uniformly distributed between zero and one. Any 
particular respondent does not have perfect information regarding other respondents’ 
preference orderings, but is assumed to form subjective beliefs regarding the chances of 
various scenarios. These are represented by decision weights that measure the extent to 
which each of the pair wise competitions are incorporated into a respondent's choice 
among admissible strategies. There are three possible pair-wise competitions, and 
consequently three decision weights,  12 w ,  13 w , and  23 w , where  1 23 13 12 = + + w w w . The 
decision weight  ij w  is the weight associated with the competition between  i a  and  j a ,   26
and it reflects the expected probability from the r espondents perspective, that the 
outcome of the survey is defined only by the competition between ai and aj. We assume 
that the value of a strategy is the weighted average of the possible outcomes of that 
strategy. Finally, we assume that the respondent is only interested in the survey if the 
response is critical in determining the alternative. Let us now analyze the incentives for 
a respondent with the preference ordering  3 2 1 a a a f f . Gutowski and Georges (1993) 
show that the only admissible strategies are to choose  1 a  or  2 a , i.e. it can never be 
optimal to choose the least preferred alternative. Consequently, with three alternatives 
the respondent has to make a choice between the most preferred or the second most 
preferred alternative. Setting the value distributions of choosing  1 a  and  2 a  equal, we 
can find the critical value of  ) ( 2 a v  at which the respondent is indifferent between a 















If the true subjective value of outcome  2 a  is larger than the critical value then the 
respondent acts strategically and chooses alternative  2 a , although alternative  1 a  is the 
most preferred alternative. A number of interesting conclusions can be drawn from this 
expression: (i) A respondent will always choose truthfully if  23 13 w w ‡ , since  1 ) ( 2 < a v . 
This means that if the perceived competition between  1 a  and  3 a  is larger than that 
between  2 a  and  3 a , the respondent will choose truthfully. Furthermore, this implies 
that in the case of equal decision weights the respondent will always choose truthfully. 
The latter case would perhaps be likely when the respondent does not have much 
information regarding other individuals' preferences, and therefore puts equal decision 
weights on all pair-wise competitions. (ii) The probability of acting truthfully is 
decreasing in  ) ( 2 a v . This means that if the utility of the two alternatives is close, then 
there is a higher probability of strategic behaviour. (iii) A respondent will in general 
only choose strategically if  23 w  is considerably larger than both  12 w  and  13 w . Three 
straightforward and important conclusions can be drawn from above. First, introducing 
imperfect information does not ensure that the degree of strategic behaviour is reduced.   27
It may well be the case that respondents form such expectations so that they act 
strategically even if they would not have done so with perfect information. Second, 
using a generic (no labels) presentation of the alternatives instead of an alternative 
specific (labels) form probably reduces the risk of strategic behaviour, since it increases 
the complexity of forming expectations regarding other respondents' preferences. Third, 
it is generally advisable to explicitly introduce uncertainty into the choice experiment. 
This can be done by saying that there is uncertainty regarding individuals’ preferences 
for the alternatives and the attributes. We believe that this strategy should be used in 
general with choice experiments. It is important to convince the respondent of the 
importance of he/she carefully answering the questionnaire, and that his/her choice can 
affect the outcome. Fourth, it is not clear whether differences  in utility between 
alternatives in a choice set should be small or large. If the utility difference is small, 
then it is more difficult for the respondents to form expectations regarding how other 
respondents will choose, thereby making it more difficult to act strategically. At the 
same time, if the alternatives are close in utility the cost of acting strategically and being 
wrong is not that high compared to choosing sincerely, thereby increasing the 
probability of choosing strategically. 
The empirical counterpart to the above discussion is tests of external validity, i.e. 
comparisons of actual and hypothetical behaviour. In transport economics, validity tests 
are either comparative studies with both hypothetical choice/ranking data and revealed 
preference data (e.g. Benjamin and Sen, 1982), or comparisons of predicted market 
shares from hypothetical choice/ranking studies with observed market shares (e.g. 
Wardman, 1988). The evidence from a large proportion of studies is that choice 
experiments generally pass external tests of validity. However, as we have discussed it 
is not obvious that these results carry over to hypothetical experiments on non-market 
goods. Carson et al. (1996) perform a meta-analysis, comparing results of CVM studies 
with revealed preference studies, and they find that the CVM estimates are slightly 
lower than their revealed preferences counterparts. However, several other experimental 
tests of the validity of CVM show that individuals overstate their WTP in hypothetical 
settings (see e.g. Cummings et al., 1995; Frykblom, 1997). We are only aware of three 
external validity tests for environmental goods. Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) conduct 
a classroom experiment consisting of both a hypothetical and an actual choice   28
experiment, and they cannot reject the hypothesis of external validity. Johansson-
Stenman and Svedsäter (2001) conduct a similar experiment as Carlsson and 
Martinsson, but allows for between-subjects tests. They find a significant difference 
between actual and hypothetical behaviour, arguing that the difference in results is due 
to their between-subjects test. Cameron et al. (1999) compare six different hypothetical 
choice formats with actual purchase behavior. They assume an underlying indirect 
utility function, which allows the data from the choice formats to be used independently 
or pooled with heteroskedasticity across the formats. They cannot reject the hypothesis 
of the same indirect utility function across the question formats: actual behavior, closed-
ended CV (phone survey), closed-ended CV (mail survey) and a pair-wise choice 
experiment.  
 
6. Welfare Effects 
The main purpose of a choice experiment is to estimate the welfare effects of changes in 
the attributes. In order to obtain these, researchers have generally assumed a simple 
functional form of the utility function by imposing a constant marginal utility of 
income. We focus on purely discrete choices; this means that in some cases welfare 
measures have to be interpreted with care in some cases. For example in the case of a 
site choice experiment, the welfare measures are per trip or per week, depending on 
what has been defined in the survey.  
Let us assume the following utility function: 
 
e + g + = z z Q A h u ) , ( ) ( ,  (18) 
 
where the function  ) (A h  captures the effect of the different attributes on utility, Q is a 
vector of personal characteristics and  z is a composite bundle. This is a flexible 
specification of the marginal utility of income as it may vary by both the level of 
income and the personal characteristics of the individual. However, let us begin with the 
common case of constant marginal utility of income and independence of personal 
characteristics. For such a utility function, the ordinary and compensated demand 
functions coincide. Given this functional form and the assumption of weak 
complementarity, we can write the conditional indirect utility function for the purely 
discrete choice as:   29
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 Furthermore, we can write the probability that alternative  j  is preferred as: 
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(20) 
 
Equation (20) shows that income does not affect the probability of choosing a certain 
alternative under the current assumptions and hence the welfare measures will have no 
income effects. Thus, we can express the unconditional indirect utility function as: 
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The Compensating Variation (CV) is obtained by solving the equality: 
) , , ( ) , , (
1 1 0 0 CV y p A V y p A V - = . Using the functional form in equation (21), we have: 
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If the error terms are extreme value distributed, i.e. the MNL model, the expected CV 
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where  0 i V m  and  1 i V m  represent the estimated indirect utility before and after the change, 
g m  is the confounded estimate of the scale parameter and the marginal utility of money   30
and S is the choice set.
7 With a linear utility function and only one attribute changing, 
the CV for a discrete choice is given by: 
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By looking at the expression in equation (25) it is easily seen that for a linear utility 
function, the marginal rate of substitution between two attributes is simply the ratio of 
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For policy purposes it is of interest, and often necessary, to obtain the distribution of 
the welfare effects. This can be done either by bootstrapping or by the Krinsky-Robb 
method (Krinsky and Robb, 1986). With bootstrapping a number of new data sets are 
generated by resampling, with replacement, of the estimated residuals. The utility across 
alternatives, along with the parameter point estimates, is calculated in order to create the 
dependent variable. For each of these new data sets the model is re-estimated and 
welfare measures are calculated. The Krinky-Robb method is based on a number of 
random draws from the asymptotic normal distribution of the parameter estimates and 
the welfare  measure is then calculated for each of these draws. The Krinsky-Robb 
method is less computationally burdensome than bootstrapping, but its success critically 
depends on how closely the distribution of errors and asymptotically normal distribution 
coincide. For example Kling (1991) and Chen and Cosslett (1998) find that the two 
procedures give quite similar standard deviations.  
The assumptions underlying the closed form solution of the welfare measures were 
(i) additive disturbances, (ii) an extreme value distribution
8 and (iii) constant marginal 
utility of income. Let us relax the assumption of constant marginal utility of income and 
no effect of personal characteristics. The CV is in generally found by solving the 
                                                 
7 Note that this welfare measure is independent of the scale and, in practice, the scale parameter is set to 
equal one.  
8 A closed form solution of the welfare measure does in fact exist for the GEV distribution in which the 
extreme value distribution is a member, see McFadden (1995).   31
equality:  ) , , ( ) , , (
1 1 0 0 CV y p A V y p A V - = . The problem is how to obtain an estimate of 
CV, when income enters the utility function nonlinearly. In such a case the marginal 
utility of income is not constant and there is no closed-form solution to calculate the 
welfare effects. McFadden (1995) suggests either estimating the welfare effects by 
simulation or by calculating theoretical bounds on the welfare effects. Morey et al 
(1993) suggest an approach using a representative consumer approach, whereas Morey 
and Rossman (2000) impose piecewise constant marginal utility of income in the 
econometric model. The simulation approach is conducted in the following steps for a 
choice experiment consisting of K alternatives, and with T choice situations for each of 
the individuals. First, at iteration t, K randomly draws from a pre-specified distribution, 
e.g. an extreme value distribution, is performed. This results in the vector 
t e . Then, a 
numerical routine is applied to search for the 
t CV , defined as:  
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If the sample of N individuals represents a random sample of the population under study 
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The approach is easy in the case of an extreme value distribution, but more difficult for 
a GEV or a multivariate normal distribution. For a more detailed discussion on the 
simulation approach see e.g. McFadden (1995) or Morey (1999). The representative 
consumer approach, describe by Morey et al. (1993), uses a utility function of a 
representative individual. The result is that the repeated draws in McFadden’s 
simulation approach can be skipped and a numerical routine can be directly applied in 
order to search for  ) (CV E . McFadden (1995) finds that this approach results in biased   32
estimations of CV  and that the percentage of bias increases with the size of the welfare 
change. The benefit of McFadden’s theoretical bounds approach is that it makes the 
computations less difficult by imposing bounds on the welfare effects from a change. 
The piecewise constant marginal utility approach by Morey and Rossman (2000) is easy 
to apply since the welfare effects can be calculated directly from the estimates. 
Furthermore, Morey and Rossman also present how to calculate the welfare effects 
when the  CV  results in a change from one income level with a specific constant 
marginal utility of income to another income level with a different constant marginal 
utility of income.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has discussed valuation of non-market goods when using choice 
experiments. The advantages of choice experiments are that values for each attribute as 
well as marginal rate of substitution between non-monetary attributes can be obtained. 
Moreover, rigorous tests of internal validity can be performed. The success of a choice 
experiment depends on the design of the experiment which, as stressed several times in 
the paper, is a dynamic process involving definition of attributes, attribute levels and 
customisation, context of the experiment, experimental design and questionnaire 
development. Important tasks in future research include improving the knowledge about 
how respondents solve a choice experiment exercise and if preferences are consistent 
over the course of the experiments. Furthermore, the choice sets created by the chosen 
experimental design strategy have an important  impact on the results. This paper 
describes the D -optimal approach. One of the problems with this approach is the 
criterion of utility balance. As we mention, it is not clear that utility balance necessarily 
improves the results and further studies are needed on this issue.  
If a stated choice preference method has to be used to value a non-market good, 
either a closed-ended CVM survey or a choice experiment can be applied. As a rule of 
thumb we would recommend that practitioners apply a closed-ended CVM survey if the 
interest is purely in valuing a certain environmental change. In other cases, a choice 
experiment may be more suitable since it produces more information. In the future, 
however, more research is needed on both methods, and particularly on their abilities to 
elicit true preferences.   33
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Figure 1: This is an example of a choice set containing two profiles of a given alternative (a 
park). Each profile is described in terms of 4 attributes, including the entrance fee. Each 
attribute has two or more levels. A choice experiment contains a sequence of such choice 
sets. 
  Park A  Park B 
Available facilities  Visitor center  Information office 
Extension of walking tracks  2 kms  10 kms 
Condition of tracks  Rustic tracks  Stoned tracks 
Entrance fee  8 US$  10 US$ 
 
Which of the two options would you prefer for a one day visit? 
? Park A      ? Park B 
 
 